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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this study is to determine the communication
relationship between U.S. Army Senior Officers and those Junior
Officers who separated from the service voluntarily from 1966
through 1970, as revealed in selected U.S. Army studies.
Origin of the Problem
During the period between 1966 and 1970, the U.S. Army

experienced a high rate of Junior Officer separations.

Department

of the Army felt that problems within the military system may have
been responsible for the high separation rate.

During this period

approximately 80 percent of the Junior Officers on active duty
chose to leave active military service.

Of these, approximately

81.36 percent elected to leave after having completed more than

two years, but less than four years, of active commissioned service,
as determined by a review of U.S. Military Personnel records at
St. Louis, Mo., in 1971.

1

A variety of studies have been undertaken, primarily by

the U.S. Army, attempting to determine the principal reasons for
these voluntary separations.

However, no specific studies were dis

covered which have attempted to assess the communication relationship

2

between Junior and Senior Officers as a possible factor contributing
to the decision to separate.
An examination of the available studies dealing with reasons
for Junior Officer separations show a substantial amount of data
dealing with the communication relationship between Junior and
Senior Officers.

Specifically, these studies are the Franklin

Institute of Research Study, "Career M.otivation of Army Personnel-
Junior Officers' Duties;" U. S. Department of the Army, Office
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Study, "Why They Leave:
Resignations from the USMA Class of 1966;" and the U.S. Army
Ordnance Center and School Study, "Ordnance Corps Officer Losses."
However, data from the studies have not been analyzed with the
view toward assessing the designated communication relationship
as a contributing factor in voluntary separations.

It is hoped

that completion of the present inquiry will lead to such an
assessment.
The author, having been a member of the active Army from
1966 through 1975, was directly involved with the problem of
Junior Officer retention. While on active duty, it was the

author's observation that communication played an important part
in retaining Junior Officers.

Upon release from active duty, the

author felt that a study should be undertaken to determine the
scope of the role communication played in Junior Officer separations.

J
Procedures
In this study the following steps have been completed in
the approximate sequence listed:
1.

A review of existing pertinent literature was conducted

to determine whether or not any studies had been done on the
communication relationship between Junior and Senior U. S. Army
Officers as a factor in voluntary separations from 1966 through

1970 .

A two step review was conducted.

The first encompassed

studies completed for or by the U.S. Govern�ent from 1967 through

the spring of 1976.

The second review encompassed studies completed

in departments of Communication and/or Speech.
The review of the U.S. Government studies was accomplished
in the following manner:
A.

Review of the U. S. Government Re

rts Announcements from

1966 through March 197 under Corporate Titles, Department of

Army, Department of Defense, Franklin Institute of Research,
and the U.S. Military Academy, West Point. (See Table I,
page 4.)
B.

Review of the U.S. Government Reports Announcements from

1966 through March 1976 under Subject Titles, Communication,

Leadership, Personnel Management, and Speech.
page 4.)

(See Table I,

In conducting the review of the government sources A and
B above, six studies were tentatively identified as possibly dealing
with a subject similar to that in the present investigation.

(1) "Career Motl vation of Army Personnel--Junior
Officers' Duties, " Technical Report 1-212, Volumes I & II,
Franklin Institute of Research Project C2081, Sept. , 1968 .
This study is being used in the present investigation.

4

TABLE I
GOVERNMENT REPORTS ANHOUNCEMENT REVIEW BY
YEAR, CORPORATE TITLE, AlrD SUBJECT

Year

Dept
of
Army

Dept
of
Def.

1966

NO

NO

1967

NO

1968

F.I.R.

PERMGT SPEECH

USMA

COMM

LDRSHP

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

1969

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

1970

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

1971

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

1972

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

1973

YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

1974

YES

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

NO

NO

1975

YES

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

YES

NO

1976

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO
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(2) "Survey of Careerists and Non-Careerists from
the USMA Classes 1963-1967 (A Product Appraisal Report), "
R obert P. Butler, Apr '71, 50p, Rpt #lXJ.01-71-003,
U.S . Military Academy, Office of Institutional Research,
Conducted May '70. AP 7 30-685, 71-22 05. This report
deals with the responses of 1250 USMA graduates from
classes of 1963-1967. A four part survey that was
conducted in May 1970. The major purpose of the study
was to gather information about the graduates in six
major areas: personal background, perceptions of their
wives' feelings toward several aspects of military life,
development of skills in various areas, perceptions
of minority group problems and drug abuse, attitudes
toward the Army, and attitudes toward items of general
interest. The respondents were divided into two groups,
careerists and non-careerists. Statistical tests of
differences between the two groups for the questionnaire
items were conducted and it found that responses of the
careerists and non-careerists differed significantly in
regard to the majority of items. This implies that the
two groups can be more clearly �efined by the information
in the six areas of the report.
( 3) "Closing the Communication Gap, " Warren G. Lawson,
26 March 1973, 33p, U. S. Army War College, AD 761-575,
73-15, 0.5A. Interpersonnel C� munications are used
within the organization to direct all actions. However,
research has confirmed that most organizational communi
cation networks are dreadfully inefficient; that the
threads of meaning which instruct and implement are
frequently broken resulting in a communication gap.
Since communication is so important to organizational
effectiveness, the many barriers impacting on the system
were studied. Data was collected using literature search
concentrating on similar problems in the business world,
and using material developed from study, research, and
discussion of 25 USAWC students within the Interpersonnel
Communication Elective (Class of 1973) . From this
research the most important barriers and gateways of an
engineering, (physical, physiological) psychological and
sociological nature are isolated. The paper [sic] designed
for publication and provided guidance to the military
commander or supervisor a recommjnded method of improving
communications in organizations.
(4) " The Lines of Communication Program in Vietnam, "
Nelson P. Convor, 8 March 1973, 60p, AD 762-255, 72-15,
15G. This study deals with the highway construction
program in Vietnam.

6
(5) "Communication and the Military Executive,"
Edwin D. Heath, Jr., 18 June 1974, 25p, USAWC, AD
787-264/lGA, 74-26, 051. The purpose of this paper is
to identify problems which inhibit effective communi
cation in the large organization and to analyze how
these problems impact on the military organization and
to recommend methods and techniqu s to make more
effective the military executive.

3

(6) "Survey of Factors Relating to the Retention
of Junior Officers, 26 July 197 5, R pt #DAPC-PMP-4-7 3-E,
AD A010-J49-9GA, 51, U. S. Army Military Personnel
Center, Personnel Management Development Directorate.
This report is based upon a survey designed to qualify
factors significant in the career decisions of Junior
Officers leaving the Army. Data were collected at 16
selected transfer points during a JO day period beginning
1 Feb 1972, approximately 1600 Junior Officers were
included in the sample.
11

After careful review of all identified studies in steps
A and B, it r..as been determined that with the exception of (1)
above, which is being utilized in the present investigation, there
were no studies completed or in progress dealing with the communi
cation relationship between Junior and Senior U.S. Army Officers
as a factor on voluntary separations from 1966 through 1970.
The review of Communication and/or Speech areas was
accomplished in the following manner:
A. Review of Speech Monographs from 1966 through 1969
under the following titles:
(1) Auer, J. Jeffery. "Doctoral Dissertations in
Speech: Work in Process . "
(2) Knower, Franklin H. "Graduate Thes es:
of Graduate Work in Speech. "
(J) Nelson, Max.
of Speech. "

An Index

"Abstracts of Theses in the Field

7
B. Review of Bibliographic Annual in Speech Communication
from 1970 through 1973 was accomplished in the following
manner:
( 1) Auer, J. Jeffery. "Doctoral Dissertations in
Speech: Work in Process. "
(2) Nelson, Max. "Graduate Theses:
Graduate Work in Speech."
(3) Nelson, Max.
of Speech."

An Index of

"Abstracts of These s in the Field

C. Review of Bibliographic Annual in Speech Communication
from 1974 through 1975 was accomplished in the following
manner:
(1) Logue, Cal M. "Abstracts of Doctoral Dissertations
in the Field of Speech Communication."

(2) Logue, Cal M.
in Speech Communication."

" Graduate Thes es and Dissertations

D. Review of Index to American Doctoral Dissertations
from 1966 through 1972.
E. R eview of Index to Doctoral Dissertations International
from 1973 through April 176.
After careful review of material in A through E above, it
has been determined that there were no recorded studies completed
or in process dealing with communication between Junior and Senior
U. S. Army Officers as a factor in the voluntary separations from
1966 through 1970.
2.

In order that this analysis may be interpreted in

terms of the environment out of which the designated separations

occurred, an attempt was made to provide the military historic
milieu of the period 1966 through 1970.
following sources were used:

In this effort the

U.S. Government documents, news

8

accounts during the 1966 through 1970 period, and other incidental

reports.

7
The study, "Ordnance Corpos Officer Losses" (hereafter

J.

referred to as the Ordnance Study), which was conducted on Ordnance
Junior Officers who separated from the service between 1966 and

1970, was in the writer's possession from the outset of this

inquiry.

4.

From the above mentioned study all items with either

the body of the question or a response dealing with the communication
relationship between Junior and Senior Officers were extracted.
This was done first by the author and then reviewed by the author's
advisor.

Additions and/or deletions to the questions were made

at that time.

The term " communication relationship" is here

(and hereafter) broadly defined to include the written and the
oral medium; verbal, non-verbal, and paralinguistic; social and
professional; formal and informal; and the various rhetorical
elements of communication--invention, style, arrangement, and
delivery.
5.

After the items dealing with the communication

relationship between Junior and Senior Officers had been selected,
the responses to the selected questions were tabulated.
6.

The study, "Why They Leave:

USMA Class of 196611

8

Resignations from the

(hereafter referred to as the West Point

Study), which was conducted on the 1966 West Point Class members who
separated from the service between 1968 and 1970, was obtained by

9
writing the Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy, West Point,
New York.
7.

From the above mentioned study all items with either

the body of the question or a response dealing with the communi
cation relationship between Junior and Senior Officers were extracted ,
following the method indicated in Step 4.
8.

After the items dealing with the communication relation

ship between Junior and Senior Officers had been selected, the
responses to the selected questions were tabulated.
9.

The study, "Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior
9
Officers' Duties" (hereafter referred to as the Franklin Study) ,
which was conducted by the Franklin Institute for the U.S. Army

on an Army-wide problem of Junior Officer retention, was procured by
writing the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania.
10 .

From the above mentioned study all items with either

the body of the question or a response dealing with the communi
cation relationship between Junior and Senior Officers were
extracted, following the method indicated in Step 4.
11.

After the items dealing with the communication rela

tionship between Junior and Senior Officers had been selected,
the responses were tabulated.
12.

Fram the data provided through the above steps, an

attempt was made to assess the degree, nature, and direction of

10
communication between the designated Junior and Senior Officers
as it related to the decision to separate.
lJ.

Finally, conclusions were drawn concerning the degree,

nature, and direction of communication between Junior and Senior
Officers as a factor in the Junior Officers' decision to separate
from active military service between 1966 and 1970.

FOOTNOTES
1

The review of Official Officer Personnel Files was con
ducted by a team of officers from the U.S. Military Academy, West
Point, and the U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School, of which the
author was an indirect member.
2
U. S. Government Reports Announcements from 1966 through
March 1976 under Corporate Titles and Subject Titles.
Jlbid.
4

Ibid.

Slbid.
6
rbid.
7

u .s. Army Ordnance Center and School. "Ordnance Corps
Officer Losses, " Aberdeen Proving Ground, May 1971. (Typewritten. )
8
u.s. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel. "Why They Leave: Resignations from the
USI1A Class of 1966, 11 July, 1970. (Typewritten. )
9Franklin Institute of Research.
"Career Motivation of
Army Personnel-Junior Officers' Duties, " Philadelphia, Sept. ,
1968. (Typewritten.)

CHAPTER II
THE VIETNAM CONFLICT
1957 through 1967
Pre United States Involvement
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief historical

sketch of the Vietnam Conflict in order to determine the environment
at the time designated U. S. Army Junior Officers voluntarily chose
to leave active duty.
The Vietnam War, also called the Second Indochina War, can
be said to have started in 1957 when Communist-led insurgents
began mounting terrorists attacks against the government of the
The causes of the conflict can
1 After
be traced back to the First Indochina War of 1946-1954.
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) .

the defeat of Japan in World War II, the French returned to Inda-

china as the colonial administrators but were challenged for

control by the Viet Minh, the Communist-led Vietnamese nationalists
2
who had established a government in northern Vietnam in 1945.
The French, in a move designed to give the impression of granting
independence to Indochina while still retaining control, granted
sovereignty to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia as "associated states"
of the French Union in 1949.3 This move allowed the new members
a seat in the French Parliament, but still gave the ruling party

13
in parliament almost total control in the Indochina governments.
All this, however, was not enough to stop the surge of Communism
in Southeast Asia .

4 In 1950, the United States began supplying

the " associated states" with economic and military aid , although
it was channeled through France .

By 1954, the United States had

furnished $2 billion of financial aid to the French War effort. 5

The French in 1954 were besieged at the fortress of Dien Bien Phu,

and in June the French National Assembly submitted to a termination
of the war .
By the Geneva Agreement of July 21, 1954, North Vietnam was

left in the hands of Ho Chi Minh and the South in the control of
non-Communist nationalists leaders.6 With the division of the two
Vietnams, the Communists, who were unable to unify and control
Vietnam through political means and elections, then turned to
military means to try to unify and control the Vietnams .

The

objective of the Vietnamese Communists remained constant through
out the war:

the over-throw of the r.on-Communist Saigon government

and its replacement with a regime that would agree to ultimate

amalgamation with Ho Chi Minh' s government at Hanoi, in the North. 7
When ths French were besieged at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954,

a request by the French for assistance was made to the United States.
The administration of President Dwight D . Eisenhower gave serious
consideration tc providing the French with air and ground forces
for support.8 Marvin Kalb, in his book, Roots of Involvement: The
U . S. in Asia 1784-1971, states:

338883
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Eisenhower determined early in his administration that
he would strive for peace and quiet. He was not always
successful. But, on at least one occasion in April 1954,
when admirals and generals came pounding at the White
House door for permission to attack and assist the French
at Dien Bien Phu and other Communist held positions, all
supported by the Vice President, Secretary of State, and
members of the Senate, Eisenhower did not yield under
pressure. He attached conditions t� his consent, which,
as it turned out, could not be met.
Without the support requested , the French were defeated and the
Vietnams were divided.

The U. S. Becomes Involved
In accordance with its obligations as a member of the South
East Asia Treaty Organization, the United States supplied military
material and equipment at the request of the Republic of Vietnam
(South Vietnam) .

A Military Assistance and Advisory Group was

established to supervise and coordinate this support program.
This commitment for support was made by President Dwight D.
Eisenhower on 10 October 1954. In 1955, the Military Assistance
and Advisory Group was given the authority by the Department of

Defense to organize and train as well as equip the armed forces of
South Vietnam as defined in the agreement signed by President
10
.
Eisenhower in 1954.
In 1957, the Communist organization in South Vietnam (the

Viet Cong) initiated a campaign of terror to undermine the authority
of the central government.

This campaign included the assassination

and kidnapping of governmental officials and supporters.

By 1960,

the number of assassinations reached 1400, and over 700 kidnappings

15
had occurred.

President John F. Kennedy approved the request for

additional aid in 1961 with the increase of 16,000 U. S. Military
11
advisory personnel.
As the communist pressure increased and
the military requirements increased, the Military Assistance
12
Command, Vietnam (MACY) was created in February 1962.
On JO July 1964, South Vietnamese naval craft raided

islands in the Gulf of Tonkin north of the 17th parallel.

The 17th

parallel was the dividing parallel line between North and South
Vietnam as set by the Geneva Agreement of 21 July 1954.

Two United

States Navy destroyers were patrolling near South Vietnamese naval
craft.

North V ietnamese naval PT boats (Patrol Torpedo Boat, a

small, highly maneuverable vessel, armed with torpedoes for action
against enemy.shipping), probably pursuing the South Vietnamese

naval craft, attacked the two United States Navy destroyers.

Two

North Vietnamese PT boats were sunk by the U. S. destroyers, and
U. S. warplanes bombed the North Vietnamese PT boat base.

This

was the first reported U.S. attack on North Vietnamese territory .13
After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, President Johnson asked

Congress for powers "to take all necessary measures to repel any

armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent
.
..14 Congress granted these powers by an overfur ther aggression.
whelming vote, though some Congressmen later stated they misunder
stood the full implications of this actio n.

Nevertheless, President

Johnson used the resolution as the chief legal basis for the U. S.

16
support of the South Vietnamese in the war.

The Gulf of Tonkin

resolution was repealed by the United States Congress in June
15
1970.
As of early March 1956, no decision had been reached by
the United States on intervention with ground forces into the
war, other than limited Marine Security force deployed to protect
Da Nang, South Vietnam.

Da Nang is a major port and city in South

Vietnam, just below the 17th parallel.

However, President Johnson

ordered air attacks over North Vietnam on military targets in
early May 1965.

Due to the grave tactical situation reported to

President Johnson by MACV and South Vietnamese government sources,
President Johnson directed the deployment of U. S. combat forces ,
using the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution as the basis for legally sending
in the forces.

At the Hawaiian Conference 9-11 April 1965, the

Secretary of Defense approved the plan for sending the first combat
troops to Vietnam.

The 173rd Airborn Brigade began arriving in

South Vietnam on 21 April 1965. This was just the beginning of the
accelerated build up. 16 President Johnson, being advised by the
Commander of HACV, General William C . Westmorland, that the South
Vietnamese could not survive very long without more U. S. combat
forces to assist the government of South Vietnam in its fight
against the communist forces, decided in mid-July to actively

commit the United States combat forces to the aid of South Vietnam. 17
The Vietnam Conflict was quite different from that for

which the United States Army had been trained.

The Vietnam War

17
was fought essentially by small units in constant pursui-t of an
elusive enemy.

In stark contrast to World War II and Korea, which

had major offensive and defensive battles with large numbers of
combat forces facing each other over defined linear front lines,
Vietnam was characterized largely by small, isolated actions con
sisting of ground and air assaults mounted from numerous isolated
base camps dotting the countryside.

There were no fixed terrain

objectives.

When some key terrain feature was at issue, it was
18
usually for a limited purpose and a designated time.
Lieutenant

General John H. Hay, Jr. , in his monograph, Tactical and Material
Innovations in Vietnam, stated:
For the U.S. Army, the war in Vietnam presented a new
type of battle fought with new weapons and new tactics
against a very different enemy. The tactics and
methods of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers
did not fit the patterns established by enemy forces
in Warld War II and the Korean War. This fact was
especially evident during the stages of the insurgency
when the enemy's main force units tried to avoid heavy
contact in favor of terrorism and ambush . Another
difference was that all of South Vietnam was a war
arena with shifting scenes of combat in comparison to
the rigidity imposed by narrow front lines character
istic of past conflicts. 19
There was no neat, linear division between enemy and
friendly forces; no front lines; and no rear boundaries.

Consequent

ly, there was neither a communications zone nor a combat zone.

In

fact, the combat zone and the communications zone were one and the
same.

The Department of the Army defines communications zone

and combat zone as follows:

18
The communications zone (COMJ1Z) comprises the area from
the rear boundary of the combat zone to the rear boundary
of the theater of operations. The COMI'1Z is regarded as
essentially a time and distance void between the comLat
force and its manpower and material replenishment. The
combat zone is that part of the theater of operations
20
required by combat troups for the conduct of operations.
At no time during the duration of the war were there any really
" secure" areaG within Vietnam.

The adaptation of the U. S. forces

to the countrywide battlefield evolved through a process of trial
and error.

Success was not clear-cut; control of the population

was often in doubt; victory or defeat lay at the grass-roots level.
Thus, there were two wars going on:

the purely military battle

against the enemy's main force, and the pacification operation.
Pacification is the process of establishing or reestablishing
effective local self-government within the political framework

of the legitimate central government and its constitution. 21

As the problems of the South Vietnamese government increased
in the country, with communist forces taking more and more territory,
steps were being taken in the United States to further involve
the country in a conflict more than 5,000 miles from its shores.
1965 Through 1970
The Buildup
The Secretary of Defense during the Hawaii Conference on
April 9-11, 1965, on the defense of Southeast Asia and the
Vietnamese situation, approved the first major troop buildup, with
an Army Combat force of over

JJ,000

troops.

The first of these

19
troops were to arrive in South Vietnam on 21 April 1965.

(See

Chart I and Table II, pages 20 and 21. )
After the April Conference in Hawaii, the Military
As sis tance Command, Vietnam requested that forces would be required
to support the action in South Vietnam .

However, the number of

troops approved by the Office of the Secretary of Defense was
always le ss than the number requested by the Military As sistance
22
Command, Vietnam.
United States Forces were built up in an unbalanced
manner.

Continued enemy pressure on th e beleaguered government of

South Vietnam and manpower ceilings combined to cause an inadequate
defense base in relation to the total force level.
communists were closer to victory than ever.

By 1967 the

American base s

populated the coast of South Vietnam, and the U. S. presence there
neare d 500, 000.

At each level of e scalation G eneral William

W estmoreland, Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam,
kept talking about "the light at the end of the tunnel" and repeated
that his last reque st woul d be sufficient, only to argue that only
100, 000 more men would be enough.

As Pre sident Johnson reported

these platitudes and examples of wishful thinking to the American

people, they began seriously to que stion the wi sdom of going into

Vietnam in the first place.

America found itself in a position

similar to that of France in the early 1950' s, stepping up the war

effort while the political position of her leadership crumbled under
criticism of the war at home.23 During the period from mid-1966

20

CHART I
AUTHORIZED TROOP LEVEL I r SOUTH VIETNAM
- -600 , 000

549 . 5

20 Jan 6 9

- -500, 000
4 4.0

- -400 , 000
- -300 , 000
- -2 00, 000
--100 , 000

0

61

62

63

64

66

67

68

70

71

Chart I shows the manpower ceilings set by the O ffice of
the Secretary o f Defense.
Source:
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TABLE I I
U. S. ARMY AND TOTA L U . S. MI LITARY
PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Date

U. S . Army Personnel

Total Military

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

800
2, 100
7, 900
10, 100
14, 700

900
J, 200
11, JOO
16, JOO
2J, JOO

Jl Mar 1965
31 Dec 1965

15, 600
116, 800

29, 100
184, JOO

Jl Mar 1966
31 Dec 1966

137, 400
239, 400

2 31, 200
485, JOO

31 Mar 1967
Jl Dec 1967

264, 600
319, 500

420, 900
485, 600

31 Mar 1968
3 1 Dec 1968

337, JOO
359, 800

515, 200
536 . 100

Jl
Jl
Jl
Jl
Jl

Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec
Dec

*31 Jan 1969
31 Mar 1969
31 Dec 1969
Jl Mar 1970
Jl Dec 1970

31 Mar 1971
J Jun 1971

365, 600
361, 500
330, 300
321, 400
250, 700
227, 600
197, 500

542, 400
538, 200
474, 400
448, 500
335, 800
301, 900
250, 900

*Indicates peak strength in South Vietnam

Between 1954-1960 U.S. Military Strength averaged � about
650 advisors .

Source:

Department of the Army, Vietnam Studies, Logistic Support,
Washington, D.C., 1974, page 14.
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to mid-1969, the authorized strength of U. S. forces in South
Vietnam rose from about 276, 000 men to a peak of 549, 000.
The Pullout
The United States balance of payments deficit between
1960-1968 was soaring, with the United States spending 16 billion
dollars more than it received from abroad, according to the U. S.
News and World Report, April 1, 1968.

The position of the U. S.

dollar in world markets was weakening, thus adding to world
inflation, according to the American Bankers Association in U. S.
N ews and World Report, August 14, 1967.

This was due in part to

the U. S. having the only economy in the Western world that was on
anything like a wartime basis.

U. S. inflation was being exported

to Europe and Japan as the vicious spiral escalated with every
increase of the war effort. As government platitudes to the public
masked a growing de spair in circles surrounding President Johnson,

riots and demonstrations spread . Anti-war manifestations were
joined by civil rights riots which grew in ferocity and destruction.
The United States was losing the Vietnam War at home.
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As the

U.S. escalated the war in Vietnam, protest activity also escalated.
The year 1965 saw not only the beginning of the U.S.' s bombing
of North Vietnam on a round-the-clock basis but also a great
number of teach-ins, marches, demonstrations, and other forms of
protest against the war. 25
The anti-draft movement became a most important branch of
the anti-Vietnam War movement.

The development seemed logical.
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W ith no draft, the war in Vietnam co uld not be fought ; there would
be too few to fight in it.

Therefo re , anyone who was against the

war sho uld be against the draft also.

Yet i t was not until the

ant i -draft protest began to concentrate its act ivit i es on the
co llege campuses that the anti -war and anti -draft movements came
26
together .
Pres ident Johnson ' s credibi lity reached new lo ws at a time
when he planned to launch his re-election campaign .

U . S . News and

W o rld R epor t , August 2 1, 196 7 stated :

There is a real and growing concern among Democrats in
Congress and the White House as they size up the po litical
o ut lo o k for the 1968 election year . The combined
i rritations of war , riots, and spending programs have
dr i ven LBJ ' s popular ity down to 39%, the lowest he has
received dur ing his 45 2onths in office according to
the latest Gallup poll . 7

The U . S. won a surprising v ictory o ver the Commun ist forces , with

the defeat of the NLF ( National Liberation Front ) , and the

VC ( V iet Con g ) at Hue to end the 1968 TET Offensive started in

J an uar y 196 8 .

Meanwhile , pressure to step down as President

mounted in the country as the anti -war demonstrations continued .
On March 10, 196 8 , General Westmoreland informed President Johnson
that he wou ld need 206, 000 more men in V i etnam , when the American
presence already stood at o ver half a million.

President Johnson

was then told by the Secretary of the Treasury and his economic
advisors that j f further escalation was contemplated, America

wo uld be forced to devalue the dollar i n o rder to meet the costs
o f the war .
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On March Jl, 1968, President Johnson decided not to seek
re-election. He knew he was beaten, not on the battlefield but
politically.

President Johnson withdrew for a number of reasons

but, basically, because "he was fed up, " beaten down by attacks
from within his own party , unable to persuade a Democratic Congress
to cooperate in any field, as reported by U.S. News and World
29
Report, April 15 , 1968.
No candidate could run or hope to win
on a promise of four more years of war.

The public, disillusioned

with Democratic war policies for the past eight years and shattered
by the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy,
turned to Richard Nixon.

For the first time during the war the

Communists were on the defensive, their TET offensive in the south
a failure.

Their best units destroyed, their carefully hoar ded

supplies near exhaustion, the Viet Cong and N LF were in no position
to mount another offensive for years .

For the first time the

Communists were on the defensive just at the moment when America
lost its wi ll to fight. 30
In June 1969, President Nixon announced the first U.S.
force withdrawals, and graduated reductions continued from then
on.31 But the war was far from over. President Nixon announced
a policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, which was a cover word
meaning a slow American withdrawal from Indochina while ARYN
(Army of the Republic of Vietnam) was trained and equipped to
maintain its newly -won positions .

Despite continuing American

withdrawals, President Nixon gave in to the Pentagon ' s request to

25
attack North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia in A pril, 1970.

The

public reaction, in the United States, to this raid was violent.
Congress oppo sed this apparent re-escalation of the war, and Presi 
dent Nixon was obligated to withdraw U . S . troops from Cambodia in

July, 1970.

The attack encouraged the American public and Congress

to urge President Nixon to step up the American withdrawal from
Indochina . 32
By 1972 the United States still had over 10 0, 000 men in
Indochina, it was another election year , and President Nixon was up
for reelection.

Just before the November elections the Secretary

of State, Henry Kissinger, announced that the end of the war was
at hand .

President Nixon won an overwhelming victory at the polls,

and in 1973 the last American troops left Indochina . 33
War Attitudes at Home

At a time when .a note of optimism was beginning to creep
into the intelligence reports on the progress of the war in Vietnam,
pessimi sm suddenly took hold in the United States .

The war, as

far as American s were concerned, appeared to be running toward a
showdown between the administration of President Johnson and the

American people . J4

Signs showed that the public--with an election drawing

closer--was becoming more and more insistent that the war in

Vietnam either be won or de-escalated by an American pull back . J S
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Polls, mail to congress, sentiment--sounding at the grass
roots--all showed that the people were becoming increasingly
irritated and impatient with a war that kept dragging

on and on.

Disappointment with the causes of the war was

evident everywhere, casualties were reaching new hig hs, progress
that had been promised had not materialized, an d the South
Vitenamese forces were not perceived as taking or accepting their
fair share of the responsibility for the fighting. 3

6

The following list of articles from the New York Times
illustrates public attitudes and sentiment about the war:
President Nixon refers to some campus radicals who oppose
his Vietnamese policies as " bums," contrasting them with
American soldiers whom he calls " the greatest." (May 1,
1970)
A blast of gun fire from the National Guard kills four

University Students, two of them young women, at Kent
(Ohio) State University. Eight other students are
wounded. The shooting came shortly after guardsmen
used tear gas to break up a noon rally of 1, 000 students
protesting the widening of the war in Indochina. (May
4, 1970)

Student demonstrators across the country step up their
protests against the Indochina war and demonstrate
their bitterness engendered by the Kent State killings.
(May 5, 1970)
Colleges across the nation close down in anti-war dem 
onstra tions for periods ranging from a day to the
remainder of the term. (May 6, 1970)
An anti-war crowd of between 75, 000 - 100 , 000 drawn mostly
from the nation ' s campuses, demonstrate near the White
House. (Nay 9, 1970)
The Hatfield-McGovern " amendment to end the war" is
defeated (55-39) in the Senate by a coalition of
R epublicans and Southern Democr at s. The amendment
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was designed to withdraw all Amer � an s from Vietn am by
the end of 197 1 . (Sept . 1, 1970 ) �
" Unr est" on the American campuses and elsewhere in the
United States among the American people grew, and even the government
itself was divided over the Indochina policies of the various
administrations since the start of the Vietnam War in 1965.

It was

this " unrest" that in the end caused the final an d eventual with
8
drawal of all American forces from Vietnam in 197 3 . 3
Military War Attitudes
As the "unrest" grew at home with the American people, so
did the "unrest" grow within the military system, especially
among those young men serving in the war zone itself, Vietnam .
The Pentagon reported a total of 495, 689 cases of desertion from

August 1964 through December 1972 . 3 9

An example of the problem within the service i s based on
per sonal experience and personal observations of the author
during his to'.lI' of duty in Vietnam from May 1969 through May 1970 .
The major problem observed was that of lack of respect for those
in command and the orders they were to carry out in connection
with the duties the young soldier was expected to complete .
were everywhere and easy to purchase for small sums of money .

Drugs

They were used as a mean s of escaping something that was unpleasant.

Alcohol was also used excessively as a means of escape.

The problems of the soldier grew as he/she learned of the

situation at home.

Draft dodgers, deserters, protests, and riots
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all played their part in making an already unpleasant job even more
unpleasant.
The young officers were also dissatisfied with the way
things were. Orders from above were often unreasonable and for
the most part unrealistic .

So it was no wonder that the young

soldier had pro blems and was dissatisfied with the way things were.
His only recourse was to rebel, which he did with great vigor
40
against anything which represented authority.

Increased Junior Officer Separations
During the period between 1966 and 1970, a large number of
U.S. Army Junior Officers chose to leave the Army for civilian
careers. Retention of Junior Officers during the 15 years preceding
1970, show in Table II I (See page 29 , ) and Table IV (See page J O .) ,

shows that 1970 had the lowest level of retention in more than 10
years.41 This level of retention was of great concern to military
leaders .

Their concern over this high incidence of Junior Officer

separations led to a number of studies:

Franklin Institute of

Research, "Career Motivation of Army Personnel--J un ior Officers'
42
Duties ; 1 1
U. S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel, "Why They Leave:
USMA Class of 1966 ; 11

43

Resignations from the

and the U. S. Army Ordnance Center and School,

" Ordnance Corps Officer Losses . 11

44

This study, using the data

provided in the above studies, represents an attempt to determine

29
TABLE I I I
PAST R ETENTION EXPERIENCE
Fiscal Yr.
1956

Number Eligible
to Leave

Number Retained

Retention Rate %

1, 404

18 . J

1, 716

21 .2

1, 634
1, 687

28.6

2, 136
2, 092
2, 540
2 , 894

33 . 1
22. 7
24 . 9
2 .5 . .5

1957

7, 672
13, 535

2, 5Jl

1959

7, 224

1, 83 5

1958

8, 094

1960

5, 713

1962

5, 680
6, 453

1961
1963

1964
1965

1966

1967
196 8
1969
1970

4, 547

9, 2 16
10, 201

11, 349

10, 486
11, 624
27, 083
30, 2.58

1, 920

2, 307
2, 813
7, 502
5, 628

18 . 7

25. 4
37 . 1
33 . 8

22. 0
24. 2
27. 7
18. 6

Note: The retention rate is the percent extending on
active duty in a Voluntary Category out of those eligible to
leave the service . The number eligible to leave are those who
have completed their obligated term of service during the fiscal
year.
Source: U. S. , Department of the Army, Headquarters,
Department of the Army Pamphlet Number 601-4, Commanders " Guide
to the Retention of Junior Officers (Washington, D.C. : Government
Printing Office , November 1970), pp. 1-1- 1-J .

TABLE IV
U . S . ARMY STRENGTH BY GRADE
Rank

2nd LT
1st LT
CPT

MAJ

LTC
COL
GEN

1966
20 , 353
15, 824
J2 , J1J
18 , 534
1J , 51J
5 , 428
503

Total
Strength 106 , 468

( 19 . 1)
( 14 . 9 )
( J0 . 1)
( 17 . 4)
( 12 . 7)
( 5 . 1)
(0 . 5 )

1967
32 , 981
18 , 685
34 , 156
20, 470
14, 841
.5 , 743
517
127 , 393

( 2 5 . 9)
( 14 , 7)
( 26 . 8)
( 16 . 1)
( 11 . 6 )
(4. 5)
( 0 . 4)

1968
35 , 466
29 , 738
3 5 , 180
22 , 903
16 , 336
6 , 024
J41
145 , 988

(24 . J )
(20 . 4)
( 2 4 . 1)
( 15 , 7)
( 11 . 2 )
(4. 1)
(0 . 2 )

1969
27 , 706
33 , 26 7
38, 796
2 5 , 20 5
16 , 806
6 , 53 7
519
148 , 836

( 18 . 6 )
( 22 . 4)
( 26 . 1)
( 16 . 9)
( 11 . J )
( 4 . 4)
( O . J)

1970
2 8, 2JO
2 5 , 938
43 , 717
2J , 447
15, 481
6 , J76
514

( 19 . 6 )
(18 . 0 )
( J 0 . 4)
( 16 . J )
( 10 . 8)
( 4 . 4)
( 0 . 5)

14J , 70J

Source : Military Personnel J?igures from the Mi litary Personnel Center Courtesy of
Department of the Army, Public Affairs, Public Information Off ice Division, W ashington, D. C.

\..,..)
0

Jl
how great a factor poor communication and a communication break
down may have been in the decision of the Junior Officer to
separate himself from active military service.
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CHAPTER I II
CONMUNI CA TION BETWEEI� JUNIOR AND
SENIOR U . S . ARNY OFFI CER S
The intent in this chapter is to provide the reader with
evidence from three U . S . Army Studies concerning J unior Off icer
R etention .

These studies were examined and data on the communication

relationship between Junior and Senior U. S . A rmy Officers have
been abstracted.
Between

1966-1970 , the U . S . Army became aware of a problem

with retention of U . S . Army Junior Officers .

Each year there was

a large number of Junior Officers leaving the A rmy for civi lian
life.

A pproximately

81 . J6% of the Junior Officers on active duty

elected to leave after having completed more than two years , but

less than four years , of active commissioned service , as determined
by the review of U . S . Army Military Personnel records at S t. Louis ,
1
I1o. , in April 1971 .
This was a costly drain of talent . Major
General F . W. Gobe , Jr . , Chief of Personnel O peration , Headquarters
Department of the Army , stated:

It is generally accepted that a decision to choose a
particular profes sion , including the military , as a
life time career is not done on a moment ' s reflection ;
it is a gradual growth , influenced by the individual ' s
day to day contact with others including the individual ' s
Senior O fficer whose influence is significan t i n career
decisions . 2
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DAPM 601-4 reported retention of Junior Officers was below

expectations, in 1966--2 , 894 ( 25. 5%) retained; in 1967--2 , 307 ( 22 . 0fo)

retained; in 1968--2 , 813 ( 24. 2% ) retained; i n 1969--7 , 502 ( 27 . 7% ) ;
and in 1970 - -5, 62 8 ( 18. 6% ) retained, J the U . S. Army attempted to

find out why.

The Army ' s efforts to learn more about the problem

of Junior Officer retention were primarily centered on three
studies.

The first study used is by The Franklin Institute of

Research, " Career Motivation of Army Personnel--Junior Officers
Duties, " hereafter referred to as the "Franklin Study. "

The second

is by the U.S. Department of the Army , Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel, " Why They Leave:

Resignations from the

United States Military Academy Class of 1966 , " hereafter referred

to as the "West Point Study. "

The third is by the U. S. Army

Ordnance Center and School Study, "Ordnance Corps Officer Losses, "
hereafter referred to as the "Ordnance Study. "
Three Studies
The F ranklin Study was completed in 1968 , the West Point

Study in 1970 , and the Ordnance Study in 1971 .

All dealt with

aspects of military life which affect the career decisions of

the Junior Officer.

However, after a detailed review of each

study, it became apparent that in the final results a clear assess
ment had not been made concerning the communication relationship
between the Junior Officer and his Senior Officer in relation to
career decisions .

Therefore, this current study was undertaken to
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evaluate the data given in the light of the specific communication
r elat ionship between Junior Officers and Senior Officers as i t

affected the J un ior Officers ' decision to separate from the Army.
The F ranklin Study
The Franklin Study was directed toward id entifying the
r elationships among the various factors tha t inf luence Junior

Officer Army career decisions.

The obj ecti ves of the study were

to :
1.

Determ ine the relationship between extrinsic
factors such as pay , duty assignments , and fr inge
benefits , and intrinsic factors such as pride ,
challenge , sati sfaction , and i ndependence .

2.

Det ermine the relationship betwe en extrinsic and
intrinsic factors and Junior Officer r e t ention.

J.

Specify what changes in the extrinsic factors ar e
mos t likely to influence the i ntrinsic factors ,
and thereby improve Junior Officer retention.

I n the s t udy, special emphasis was given to duty assignments ,

car eer management , duties and their content and car e er counseling .
The group selected for study was company grade officers with more
than six months but less than five years of active federal

commissioned service .

The study was performed for the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Personnel , Depar tment of the Army , by Systems
Science Depar tment of the Franklin I nstitu te R esearch Laborator ies
of Phi ladelphia , Pennsy lvania , September 1968 .

4

JS
The West Point S tud y

The W est Point study was dir ected toward learning why

2 J . 1%

of the members of the USHA Class of 1966 t endered their r esignations

from the service .

The study addressed itself to the resignation problem by
seeking the r easons and answers to thr ee questions .
1.

Why did the members of the U SMA Class of 1966
r esign?

2.

How does the quality of the r esign e es compare
with that of the stay-ins?

J.

What can be done to reduce r esignations when
the U SMA classes becom e eligible to leave the
Army?

The study was conduct ed by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel , Washington , D. C . , J uly 1970 .

5

The Ordnance Study
The Ordnance Study was dir ected toward learning why 466

Ordnance Officers chose to leave the military service aft e r

having completed mor e than two years, but less than four years ,
of active duty, and identifying those factors tha t influenced the

Junior Officers ' car eer decisions.

The study addressed itself to four sources of influence
in Junior Officer re tention:
1.

2.

C ivilian vs . military car e er oppor tunities .

The effect of R epublic of Viet Nam tour
of duty on the career decision.

J9

J.

The effect of a terminal RVN tour of d uty on the
career decision.

4.

Other factors, as indicated by the survey question
naire r esponses, which affected the career
decision .

The study was conducted by the Personnel Management
Division, Office of the Secretary , U . S. Army Ordnance Center and
Schoo 1 , Aberdeen Proving Gr ound , Mary land , May 1971.

6

Method of Analysis
Completion of a search for related research r evealed no
studies which dealt primarily with communicat.i on or the lack of
communica tion or which attempted to discover if poor communication
between J unior and Senior Officers was a factor in Junior Officer
retention .
In the studies being analyzed for this project, the
researcher observed numerous questions which dealt with the
communication r elationship between Junior and Senior Officers.
However , there had been no effort to interpret r esponses to those
communication questions as a whole unit and draw conclusions from
them.

It is the intent of this study to do so .
The communication questions in each study were selected ,

based on the r esearcher ' s own experience with communication and

whether the body of the question or a response d ealt with a communi
cation relationship between J unior and Senior Officers .

All

questions selected , together with the full text of the studies , were

submitted to the thesis advisor, and agreement was achieved as to
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which questions were to be considered " communi cat ion quest ions . "
( See Chapter 1, page 8 , paragraph 4 . )

Each ques tion in each study was analyzed based on the above
cri t eria .

A breakdown by study as to the number of communication

quest ions vs . total questions is as follows :

a.
b.
c.

The Fran klin Study
The W es t Point Study
The Ordnance Study

To tal
Questions

Communications
Questions

424
70
116
610

41 (9 . 7% )
14 ( 20% )
2 8 ( 24% )
83( 13 . 6%)

The remainder of this chapter is d ivided into four parts .
Par t one contains an analysis of i tems d ealing w i th communication
s elected from the Fran klin S tudy .

Par t two consists of an analysis

of i tems d ealin� w ith communication sel ected from the West Point
Study.

Part thr e e includ es a similar analysis of items s elected

from the Ordnance Study.

Finally , part four is a summary of the

chapter.
Frankl in I nstitute of R esearch Study
The F r anklin Study was dir ected to ward id ent ifying the

relationshi ps amo ng var ious factors that influence Junior Officer
Army c ar eer d e c isions .

The group s elected for study was company

grad e officers with mor e than six mo nths, but less than fi ve years, of
act ive federal commissioned servi c e.
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The Franklin Study questionnaire was distributed to more
than 4, 500 Junior Officers.

Junior Officers.

Response s were collected from 2 , 977

All questions and answers in the Franklin Study were based
on an attitudinal scale.

The intensity index was based on the

scale from onP. ( 1) to seven ( 7 ) which the respondents used on the

surveys .

Checking one (1) meant the reason had little or no

influence on the individual.

A two (2) or three (J) meant the

reason had limited influence on the individual.

A four (4) meant

the reason had a moderate influence on the individual.

A five (5)

or six (6) meant the reason had a strong influence on the individual,
and a seven ( 7) meant the reason had a decisive influence on the
individual.

If all 2 , 977 respondents had checked the "7" column,

the overal l intensity index for the question would appear as
seven.

If, however, 1, 500 had checked seven (7) and 1, 477 had

checked one (1) , the intensity index would be the sum of 1, 500 x 7
and 1, 477 x 1 , with the total divided by 2 , 977 or 4 . 02 .

Since

some questions were worded in such a manner that the more desirable

response, indicating a positive communication relationship, was
at the lower end of the scale, the scale needed to be inverted
before the Intensity Index was computed ( See H-4, H-12, and H-15.) .
In computing the Mean Intensity Index for the entire study less
the communication questions, the same inversion was followed for
"negatively'' phrased questions.
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Those questions with fewer than, or more than, seven
responses were not included in the intensity index.

However, they

were considered when an analysis of the study was performed.
The questions selected from the Franklin Study, on the basis
of dealing with communication, were
HHHHHH-

1 Recognized my individual contributions
2 Give constructive c:riticism
J Listen to my suggestions
4 Critique me in front of others
5 Commend me for good work
6 Give me the opportunity for independent action and
initiative
H- 7 Treat me as a mature person
H- 8 Are inspiring leaders
H- 9 Exhibit integrity
H-10 Expect high quality work from me
H-11 Give me counsel and guidance when needed
H-12 Pass the buck
H-13 Communicate their orders clearly
H-14 Show concern for welfare of their subordinates
H-15 Over supervise
H-16 Consider "inexperience" in their evaluation of
Junior Officers
H-17 Understand the problems of Junior Officers
H-18 Are objective in their Efficiency Ratings
H-19 Assume responsiblity for their mistakes
H-20 Do you believe that Senior Officers utilized the
Efficiency Reporting System in such a manner as
to assume that the most qualified Junior Officers
are selected for promotion?
H-21 What effect do your relationships with Senior
Officers have on your Army Career decisions?
I - 1 Intelligence
I- 2 Competence
I - 3 Moral character
I - 5 Maturity
I - 6 Thoroughness
I - 7 Sensitivity to others
I- 8 Respect for fellow officers
I-10 .Leadership
I - 11 Integrity
r-13 Skill in communicating verbally and in writing
I-14 Military bearing
I - 15 Self confidence

4J
Ability to communicate
Ability to make decisions
Sensitivity to others
Ability to accept and follow orders
Officer Efficiency Reports
How many formal or informal career-counseling
interviews have you had with your Senior Officers?
M- 2 W hat was the attitude of your career counselor
towards you and your career?
M- 3 What effect have these career-counseling sessions
had on your career decision?

J -16
J -17
J -18
J -19
D-22
M- 1

In analysis of the Franklin Study, the series of
questions and answers are on the basis of the J unior Officers '
experience.

The Junior Officer was to indicate the extent to

which each statement described the Senior Officer under whom the
Junior Officer served.

Answers were based on an attitudinal

scale .
H- 1

Recogn i zed my individual contributions
1.

Intensity
Index

4 . 49

2.
J.
4.

5.

6.
7.

Highly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate
Highly accurate

119 respondents
179
298
89 3
714
566
208

4%
6%

II

ti
fl

ti

ti

ti

1 0%

JO%
2 4%
19%

7%

The majority of resp cndents felt that their Senior Officers
recognized their individual contributions to the unit to which
they were assigned.

This response was mildly positive in nature

toward communication between Junior and Senior Officers.
H- 2

Give constructive criticism
1.

Intensity
Index

4 . 52

2.

J.

4.

5.

Highly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate

179 respondents
,,
208
387
685
"
714
II

ti

6%
7fo

13%
23%
24%
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6.

7.

Highly accurate

566 respondents

266

"

The majority of respondents felt that they were given constructive
criticism.

The 4. 52 intensity index constituted moderately

positive communication response.
H- 3

Listen to my suggestions
1.

Intensity
Index
4. 46

2.

J.
4.

5.

6.
7.

Highly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate
Highly accurate

20 8 r espondents
ti
208
"
J27
"
6 55

685

566
298

"
"
"

7%
7%

11%

22°/4

2.3%

19%

l (}J/4

The majority of respondents felt their Senior Officers listened to
their suggestions.

This again constituted a moderately po sitive

communication response.
H- 4
Intensity
Index
4. 97

Critique me in front of others
7.
6.
5.
4.

3.

2.

1.

H ighly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate
Highly accurate

774 respondents
ti
506
476

625

298
149
119

..

II

"

II

"

26%
17%
16%
2}S{
10',i&

5%

4%

In this instance "critique me in front of others" represents an
und e � i ab le (negative) communication practice.

Therefore, the

rating of 1 is more desirable and the scale was inverted before
the intensity index was computed.
H- 5
Intensity
Index
4. 62

Commend me for good work
1.

Highly inaccurate

4.

Somewhat accurate

2.
J.
5.

179 respondents
"
208
"
2J8

655

685

"
"

6%

77/o
8,%

22%
23%

6.

7.

Highly accurate

625 respondents
"
357

2 1%
12%

The majority of individuals felt that their Senior Officers did
commend them for good work, thus a moderately po sitive communication
response.
H- 6

Give me the opportunity for independent action and
initiative
1.

Intensity
Index

4 . 42

Highly inaccurate

2.
3.
4 . Somewhat accurate
5.
6.
7 . Highly accurate

327 respondents
"
238
298
"
536
"
566
"
595
"
417
fl

The majority of individuals felt that they were given some
opportunity for independent action and initiative.

1 1%

8%
1 0%

1 8%
19%
2 0%
14%

This constitutes

a moderately positive communication response.
H- 7

Treat me as a mature person
1.

Intensity
Index

5 . 12

Highly inaccurate

2.
3.
4. Somewhat accurate
5.
6.
7 . Highly accurate

179 respondents
"
119
179
"
447
"
506
804
"
714
II

II

6%
4%
6%
15%
17%
2 7/o
24%

The majority of individuals felt that they were treated as mature
individuals.

The 5 . 12 intensity index constitutes a more positive

communication response.

H- 8 Are inspiring leaders
1.

Intensity
Index

4. 05

2.
J.

Highly inaccurate

4 . Somewhat accurate
5.

327 respondents
,,
298
"
357
744
566
II
II

1 1%
1 0%

12%
25%
19%
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6.
7.

Highly accurate

447 respondents
,,
208

The majority felt that their leaders were inspiring.

15%

7%

A neutral

communication response is indicated by the intensity index .
H- 9

Exhibit integrity
1.

I ntensity
Index
4. 75

2.

J.

Highly inaccurate

4.

Somewhat accurate

6.
7.

Highly accurate

5.

149 respondents
"
179
"
268

6 55

625
685
447

"
"
"
"

6%
22%
2 1%
23%
15%

The majority of individuals felt that their Senior Officers did
exhibit integrity .

This constitutes a moderately poSitive

communication response.
H-10

Expect high quality work from me
1.

Intensity
Index
5 . 83

2.

J.
4.

5.

6.
7.

Highly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate
Highly accurate

JO respondents
"
JO

60
327
476
982
1072

..

II

II

"
II

1%
1%
2%
1 1%
16%
33%
36%

The majority of res:rx:mdents felt that their superiors expected high
quality work from them.

The intensity index indicates a strong

positive communication response.
H-11

Give me counsel and guidance when needed
1.

Intensity
I ndex
4. 57

2.

J.

4.

5.

Highly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate

6.
7. Highly accurate

238 respondents
208
"
327
744
"
5 06
"
566
"
417
fl

II

8%
7/o

1 1%

25%

17%

19%

1 4r}b

47
The majority felt that Senior Officers gave them guidance and
counseling when it was needed, thus - constituting a positive

communicatio n response .
H-12
Intensity
Index
4. 36

Pass the buck
7.
6.
5.
4.
3.
2.
1.

Highly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate
Highly accurate

5 36 respondents
ti
447
"
445
ti
595
357
"
298
"
268
II

1�
15%
15%
2 0%
12%
1 0%

9%

"Pass the Buck" represents negative communication practice.
Therefore the rating of 1 is the more desirable and the scale was
inverted before the intensity index was computed.
H-1 3 Communicate their orders clearly
1.

Intensity
Index
4. 51

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

Highly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate
Highly accurate

149 respondents
fl
179
"
357
ti
7 14
"
744
"
566
"
268

5%
6%
12%
24%
25%
19%

9%

The majority of the respondents felt that their Senior Officers
did communicate their orders clearly.

A moderately positive

communication response was indicated.
H-14
Intensity
Index
4.6J

Show concern for welfare of the subordinates
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Highly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate
Highly accurate

17 9 respondents
208
298
625

595

625
417

6%
'7/o
10%
2 1%
2(1}&
2 1%
14%
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The majority felt that their superiors did show concern for those
under their supervision .

response was indicated.
H-15
Intensity
Index
4 . 08

Again a moderately positive communication

Over supervise

7 . Highly inaccurate

6.

5.

4.
3.
2.
1.

Somewhat accurate
Highly accurate

3 5 7 respondents
387

566
566

387

357
357

ti

ti

"

ti
ti
II

12%
13%
19%
19%
13%
12%
12%

"Over supervise" represents a mean neutral communication response
as indicated by the intensity index.
H-16

Intensity
Index
4 . 57

Consider "inexperien ce" in their evaluation of
Junior Officers
1.

Highly inaccurate

4.

Somewhat ac curate

129 respondents
17 9
268
834

Highly accurate

327

2.
3.

5.

6.
7.

595
595

5%

6%

g'/o

28;&
2 0%
2 0%
1 1%

The majority felt that their Senior Officers did consider their
inexperience when rating them.

The intensity index indicates a

mild positive communication response.
H-17

Understand the problems of Junior Officers
1.

Intensity
Index
4.52

2.

J.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Highly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate
Highly accurate

149 respondents
"
179
298
"
834
625
II

II

595

268

"
"

5%

6%

1 0%
2 8}&
2 1%
2 0%

Wo
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The majority of individual respondents felt that their Senior
Officers did understand their problems , which, combined with the

intensity index , leads to a positive communication response.
H-18 Are objective in their Efficiency Ratings

Intensity
Index

4 . 6J

1.
2.

Highly inaccurate

J.

4. Somewhat accurate
5.
6.
7 . Highly accurate

179 respondents
179
"
238
"
804
"
625
"
655
"
298

6%
6%

II

27%
21,%
22%
1�

The majority of individual responses felt that their Senior
Officers were objective in their efficiency ratings.

The intensity

index reveals a moderately po sitive communication r esponse.
H-19 Assume responsibility for their mistakes
1.

Intensity
Index
4 . 54

2.

J.

4.

5.
6.
7.

Highly inaccurate
Somewhat accurate

208 respondents
"
208
"
3 57
,,
655
"
536
625
"
417
II

Highly accurate

7/o
?7/o

12%

2c'fo

18}0

2 1.,%

14%

The majority of respondents felt that their Senior Officers did
assume responsibility for their mistakes.

Again the communication

response is positive in terms of the intensity index.
H-20

Do you believe that Senior Officers utilized the
Efficiency Report ing System in such a manner as
to assume that most qualified J unior Officers
are selected for promotion?
1.

2.

J.

Yes

No
No opin ion

1101 respondents
12 50
"
625
"

37%
42%
2 1%

50
The majority of respondents did not feel their Senior Officers
utilized the Efficiency Reporting System in a way that would assure
the most qualified were selected for promotion.

This constitutes

one of the small number of negative communication responses.
H-21 What effect do your relationships with Senior
Officers have on your Army career decision?
1.

Intensity
Index
4. 01

2.

J.

4.

5.

6.
7.

Strong influence to stay
No influence
Strong influence to leave

208 respondents
"
3 87

536

774
447
268
3 27

"

II

"

7%

13%
1&70
26%

15%

II

CJ7/o
1 1%

II

The majority of respondents felt that their relationships with
Senior Officers had no influence on Army career decision.

However,

the percentage of individuals who responded to " strong influence to
leave" was higher than the percentage of individuals who responded
to "strong influence to stay. " Viewed with the intensity index, a
neutral communication effect is found among respondents.

In the next series of questions the Junior Officer was

asked to evaluate his fellow Junior Officer.
I- 1

Intelligence

7.

6.

Intensity
Index

5 . 18

5.

lJ..

J.

2.
1.

Exhibit to a High Degree
(EHD)
Exhibit to a Moderate
Degree (EMD)
Does not Exhibit (DNE )

2J8 respondents
9 53

1072

566

1 19

JO
0

"

II

"
"
"
"

8%

32%
J 6%
1CJ7/o

4%

1$&
afo
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The majority of individuals felt that their fellow Junior Officers
exhibited a moderate or strong degree of intelligence.

A relatively

high positive communication response was found.
I- 2

Competence

?.

6.
5.
4.
J.
2.
1.

Intensity
Index
5 . 02

EHD
EMD

mm

179 respondents
8J4
"
110 1
"
655
"
149
"
60
II

0

6%

28}b

37/4

22%

5%

2%

0%

fl

The majority of individuals felt that their fellow Junior Officers
did exhibit to a moderate degr ee, competence in their work.

The

results were positive.
I- J Moral character
Intensity
Ind ex
4.92

7.
6.

EHD

4.
J.

E11D

5.

2.
1.

DNE

298 respondents
744
8J4
744
268
89
30

lCr'/4

2 5%
2 8}b

25%

9%

3%

1%

The majority of respondents felt that their fellow Junior Officers
were of moral character and exhibited this to a moderate degree,
thus a moderately lX)sitive communication response.
I- 5
Intensity
I ndex
4. 68

.Ma turity
7.

6.

5.

4.
J.
2.

1.

EHD

EMD
DNE

17 9 respondents

62 5

893
744
357
119
JO

"
"
II

II

"
"

6%

2 1%

JO%
25%
12%
4%
1%
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The majority of individuals credited their fellow Junior Officers
with moderate degree of maturity exhibited during the performance
of their duties.

This can be considered a somewhat positive

communication response.
I- 6

Thoroughness
,..,

I •

6.

I ntensity
Index
4. 48

5.

4.
J.
2.

1.

89 respondents
"
476
"
92J
"
92J
"
447
"
89
It
JO

EHD
EHD
DNE

']fa
16%
3 1%
31%
15%
3%

1%

The majority felt that their fellow officers displayed a moderate
amount of thoroughness when completing a task.

A mild positive

communication response was found.
I- 7
Intensity
Index
4. 47

Sensitivity to others

7.

6.

5.

4.

J.

2.
1

EHD

119 respondents
"
447
8J4
10 12
"
387
"
119
"
JO
ti

EMD
DNE

ti

4%
15%
2 8%
34%
13%
4%

l1o

Thirty -four percent of the respondents felt that their fellow
officers exhibited a moderate amount of sensitivity to others when
dealing with personnel.

The intensity index reveals a mildly positive

communication response.
I - 8 Respect for fellow officers
Intensity
Index
4. 97

7.
6.

EHD

4.

EMD

5.

J.

298 respondents
It
804
8J4
"
685
"
208

..

10%
2 7}b
2 8fo

23%

7/o

5J
2.

1.

DNE

89 respondents
"
JO

The majority of respondents felt that their fellow officers dis
played this trait to a moderate degree which combined with the
intensity index constitutes a positive communication response .
I -10

Leadership
7.

I ntensity
Index
4. 83

6.

5.

4.

J.

2.
1.

EHD
EMD
DNE

4%
24%

119 respondents
"
714
"
1104
"
744
"
208
"
60
"
JO

37%
2.5%

7fo

2%

]%

R esponses to this item constitute a moderately positive communication
response.
I-11

Integrity
7.

I ntensity
Index

5 . 05

6.

5.

4.

J.

2.

1.

EHD

EMD
DNE

11%
2 8%
2g/o
2).%
6%
2%

J27 respondents
"
8J4

863

6 85
179
60
JO

"
"

ti

"
"

1%

Responses reveal the majority felt that their fellow officers
displayed integrity to a moderate or greater degree .

A positive

communication response is revealed by the intensity index.
I -lJ
Int ensity
Index
4. 55

Skill in communicating verbally and in writ;i.ng

7.
6.

5.

EHD

4.

EMD

1.

DNE

J.

2.

149 respondents

566

893
8 J4

357

149
60

ti

"
"

..

"
"

19%

. J O%

2 8%
1 2%

5%

2%
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In order to lead others an individual must be able to communicate,
verbally and/or in writing.

The majority felt that their fellow

Junior Officers exhibited this ability.

A moderately positive

communication response is supported by this intensity index.
I-14
I ntensity
Index
4. 83

Military bearing
7.

EHD

5.
4.
3.
2.

EMD

6.

1.

179 respo ndents
744
953
714
298
"
60
30
II
II

DNE

II

II

It

6%
25%
32%
24%
10%

1%

The majority felt that their fellow Junior Officers displayed a
moderate degree of military bearing, and an intensity index of
4.8J constitutes a qualified positive communication response.
I-15
Intensity
Index
5.12

Self Confidence

7.

6.
5.
4.
3.
2.

1.

EHD
EMD
DNE

208 respondents
"
953
"
10 12
625
"
149
II

JO
0

ti

ti

32%
34%
2 1%
5%
0,_h

The majority felt that their fellow officers displayed a moderate

degree of self co nfidence , which, combined with an intensity index

of 5. 12, constitutes a positive communication response.

The next series of responses deals with how the individual
Junior Officer perceived himself.
J-16

Ability to Communicate

1.
2.
J.

DNE

0 respondents
0

60

ti

"
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Intensity
Index
5.65

4.

5.

6.

J27 respondents
"
804
"
1161

EMD

7 . EHD

595

"

11%

27/4

39%
20%

The majority of responding individuals felt that they exhibited to

a moderately high degree the ability to communicate.

The

5 . 65

intensity index constitutes a positive intra-personal communication
response .

J-17

Ability to make decisions
1.

2.

Intensity
Index
5 . 88

0 respondents
"
0

DNE

JO

J.
4 . EMD
5.
6.
7.

208

655

1280
804

EHD

"
"
"

II

"

CY/a
CY/a

22%
4}%

2';%

The majority felt that they exhibited to a moderately high degree
the ability to make decisions .

This and the intensity index of

5. 88 constitutes a positive intra-personal communication response.
J-18

Sensitivity to others
1.

DNE

2.
J.
4. EMD

Intensity
Index

5 . 61

5.

6.

7.

EHD

JO respondents
"
JO
"
89
"
J87

625

1042
774

"
"
II

1%
l}Jb

2 1%
3 5%
26%

The majority felt that they displayed a moderate to high degree of
sensitivity to others. Again the higher intensity index indicates
a positive inter-personal communication response.
J-19

Ability to accept and follow orders

1.
2.

DNE

0 respondents
"
JO

CJfo
1%

Intensity
Index
5. 89

J.
4.

5.

6.
7.

60 respondents
2J8

EMD
EHD

II

"

506

1161
95 3

�

17%

J9%
J2%

II

II

The majority of individuals felt that they displayed a moderately
high degree of ability to accept and follow orders.

The intensity

index supports this conclusion and a positive communication
respmse.
D-22 Officer Efficiency Reports
Intensity
Index
J .6J

7.

6.

5.

4.
3.
2.
1.

Strong influence to stay
No influence

89 respondents
"
149
"
2 08
1578
II

357

Strong influence to leave

II

268
327

II

"

The Officer Efficiency Report is considered a written form of
communication between a Senior Officer and a Junior Officer.

5'Y/o

12%

11%

As

answered by the majority of individuals, this communication document
did not in�luence their decision to leave or stay on active duty,
but the above mean intensity index reveals a negative communication
response.
M- 1 How many formal or informal career 0 counseling
interviews have you had with your Senior Officer?
1.

2.
3.

4.

5.

One
Two
Three
Four or more
None

506 respondents
,,
J87
208
"
476
"
1369
II

17%

lJlo

16%
46%

This question and response shows a definite lack of communication

between Junior and Senior Officers, with a plurality stating that
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they did not receive any formal or informal car e er-counseling
i nterviews.

This constitutes a negative commun ication response

betwe en Jun ior and Senior Officers.
M- 2

W hat was the attitude of your car e er counselor
towards you and your career? ( Ente r " 0" if you
have not been counsel ed. )
1.

Not i nter ested

J.
4.

Mod erately interested

2.

Intensity
I ndex

5 . 35

5.

6.
7 . V ery inter ested

JO respond ents

JO
89
298
298
J 87
417

"
"
"
"
"
"

1%
10%
10%
13%
14%

Of those individuals who did have car e er-counseling interviews ,
the majority f elt that their counselors were inter ested in the
individual.

The high intensity index indicates a positive inter 

personal communication r esponse .
M- J

I ntensity
I nd ex

4 .21

What e ffect have these car e er -counseling sessions
had on your Army car e er d ecision ?

7.

Strong influence to stay

4.

No. influence

1.

Strong influence to leave

6.

5.

J.
2.

119 r espondents 4}�
179
6�
12%
357
1369
46%
119
4%
60
89
'J'/o

In r elation to M -2 the commun ication relationship established
between the counselor and the Junior O ff icer had only a mild

positive influence or none on the career decision of the Junior

O fficer .

This constitutes a n eutral to po sitive inter -personal

communication r esponse.

/0
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The total number of questions in the Franklin Study was

424 (less questions with fewer/more than seven responses and less

communication questions) with a mean average intensity index of

J . 94 as indicated on the graph.

The mean average response to

communication questions intensity index of 4 . 77 is placed above

No
Influence

2

3

J . 94

4 . 77

Moderate
Influence

6

Strong
Influence

the moderate influence toward the strong influence , indicating that
the communication series of questions played a greater part in
influencing the Junior Officers relationship with his Senior
Officer than did the composite of remaining items.

However, the

relationship that communications played in the Franklin Study had
little or no effect on the Junior Officers' Career decisions.

If

anything could be assumed, communication between J unior and Senior
Officers was not a negative factor in causing the Junior Officer
to separate but was a positive factor causing the J unior Officer
to remain on active duty.
At the time the Franklin Study was completed, Army

ret ention of Junior Officers was high, 24. 2%, indicating that the
problems surfacing from Vietnam, as outlined in Chapter I I, may not
have influenced the Junior Officer to any great extent as of 1968 ,
when the study was completed.
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The West Poin t S tudy
The second part of this chapter deals with the questions
and answers of the W est Poi nt Study, completed on 6 J uly 1970 .

I n Jun e 1970 , the U.S . Army became extremely concerned

because a hifsh percentage rate ( 23 . 1% ) of the United States

Military Academy Class of 1966 who were commiss ioned in the Army
had tendered their resignations from active duty.

The average

resignation rate of the past 12 classes had been 15.5%, a 7 . 6%

i ncrease.

8

The West Point Study addressed i tself to the

resignation problem by seeking the answers to three questions :
A.
B.
C.

W hy did members of the USMA Class of 1966 resign?
How does the quality of the resignees compare
with that of the stay ins ?
W hat can be done to reduce resignat ions from the
USMA classes?

This s tudy includes one phase of the W est Point Study -
the communication relationship between the J un ior Officer
res ignees and their Senior Officers .

There were 81 individuals

who responded to the questionnaire.

All questions and answers in the W est Point Study were

based on an attitudinal scale.

The intensity index was based on

the scale from one ( 1) to six ( 6 ) which the respondents used on
the surveys.

Checking one ( 1 ) meant the reason had no influence

and was not applicable to the individual.
reason was decisive.

A s ix ( 6 ) mean t the

If all 81 respondents had checked the " 6"

column, the over -all intensity index would appear as six.

If ,

however, 40 had checked six ( 6 ) and 41 the one ( 1 ) the intensity
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index would be the sum of 40 x 6 and 41 x 1, with the total
divided ·by 81 or J.46.
The W est Point S t udy consisted of 70 questions dealing

with those aspects of military life which dir ectly affected the
J unior Officer.

The questions d ealing with communication ar e

listed by question number and the intensity index .
Question 2 5 :

Lack o f authority commensurate with your
responsibilities.

The cat egory of decisive ( 6 ) was selected by 4J% of the individuals.
The total r esponse intensity index was J. 15.
Question 2 7 :

Your suggestions not list ened to.

The category of decisive ( 6 ) was selected by J2.4J% of the
individuals.

The total r esponse intensity index was 2.74.

Question 2 8:

Lack of oppor tunity for independent action
and initiative.

The cat egory of decisive ( 6 ) was selected by 53.53% of the
individuals.

The total r esponse intensity index was 3. 56.

�uestion 2 9 :

Officer efficiency r epor ts .

The category of decisive ( 6 ) was sel ected by 45/o of the individuals.
The total r esponse intensity index was J . 15.
Question 4J :

Your leaders w er e not inspiring.

The category of decisive ( 6 ) was selected by 5 1 . 2 5% of the
individuals .

The toal r espo nse intensity index was J . 47 .

Question 44:

Lack of integrity of super iors.

The category of decisive · ( 6 ) was selected by 51% of the individuals.
The total r esponse intensity index was J . 46 .
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Qu estion

45 :

Superiors o ver super v ised.

The categor y o f decisive ( 6 ) was sele cted by 50. 74% o f the
i ndividuals .

The total response intensity index was J . 45 .

Qu estion 46 :

Superiors did not understand yo ur problem .

The category of decisive ( 6 ) was selected by 2 4 . 17% o f the

individuals.

Th e total respo nse intensity in dex was 2 . 42 .

Question 47 :

Super iors did not assume responsibility
for their mistakes .

The category of decisiv e ( 6) was sele- cted by 14 . 97fe o f the
indi viduals .

The total response intensity index was J . 11 .

Question 48:

Superiors were no t competent.

The category o f decisiv e ( 6 ) was selected by 47 . 9% o f the
indi viduals .

The total response intensity index was J . J4 .

Question 49 :

Superiors w ere not dedicated .

The categor y of de cisive
individuals.

The total response intensity was 2 . lJ .

Question 50 :

Superiors were not courageous.

The catego ry o f de cisive
individuals .

(6) was selected by 16. 69% o f the

(6) was se lected by 24 . 42% o f the

The total response intensity index was 2 . 43 .

Questio n 5 1 :

Lac k of accessibility of Senior Offi cer
for advice and co unseling .

The category of decisi ve ( 6 ) was sele cted by 11. 7% o f the
individuals .

The to tal response intensity index was 1 . 94 .

Question 52 :

Cr iticized inappro pr iately o r for in valid
reasons.

The category of decisiv e ( 6 ) was s�le cted by 2 1 . 85% of the
indi viduals.

The total response intensity index was 2. JJ.
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In analyzing the decisive reasons why individuals left

active service, those questions which dealt with communication were
further examined as to the percentage of respondents who answered
each question in relation to the intensity index selected.
The following order of most decisive to least decisive
questions is listed by question number and the percentage of
responses to each qu estion.
Question 28 :

Lack of opportunity for independent
action and initiative

Question 43 :

Your leaders were not inspiring

Question 44:

Lack of integrity of superiors

Question 45 :

Superiors over supervised

50 . 7/o

Question 48:

Superiors were not competent

Question 29 :

Officer efficiency reports

47. CJ/4

Question 25 :

Lack of authority commensurate
with your responsibilities

Question 47:

Superiors did not assume respon
sibility for their mistakes

41.9%

Question 27:

Your suggestions not listened to

32.4%

Question 50 :

Superiors were not courageous

53.6%

53.6%

5 1 � 0%

4J. 0%

24. 4%

Question 46 :

Superiors did not understand your
problem

24 . 1,%

Question 52 :

Criticized inappropriately or for
invalid reasons

2 1 . gfo

Question 49 :

Superiors were not dedicated

16 . 7/o

Question 51:

Lack of accessibility of Senior
Officers for advice and counseling

1 1 . 8;0

6J
The West Point Study with 7 0 questions had a mean remaining
question average intensity index of 2. 54 as indicated on the graph.
The mean average commun ication question intensity index of 2 . 91 as
shown on the graph indicates that poor communication in a composite
1
2
No
Influence

J

4
5
Noderate
I nfluence

Strong
Influence

form appears to have had a greater influence on the West Pointer
in his Army Career decision than did the composite non-communication
factors covered in the West Point Study.
Further analysis shows the majority of respondents had
accessibility to their Senior Officers .

However, a majority felt

their Senior Officers were not inspiring, lacked integrity, and over
supervised them.
The Ordnance Study
In the present analysis of the Ordnance Study, which consisted
of 116 questions, only those questions which dealt primarily with
the communication relationship between the J unior and Senior

Officers were selected.

A total of twenty-eight (28) questions

was identified as dealing with communication factors.
The analysis of the Ordnance Study differs somewhat from
the Franklin Study and the West Point Study in that intensity

indexes could not be computed, due to the study format which does

not allow for a v �lid numerical difference between answer
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discriminations .

The study , however , allows question analysis by

the use of percentages ,

An answer discrimination was selected

for each question, based on the total nwnber of responses .

Each

question will be discussed in detail in chronological order as it
appears in the questionnaire .
Question

J.

With which one of the following aspects of

military life were you most dissatisfied?
a.
b.
c.

d.
e.

Separation from family
Pay
Frequent PCS ( permanent change of
station) moves
Leadership of superiors
Housing

BJ respondents
"

16

"
"
"

27
107
11

Within the scope of this question and the various
discriminations which the respondent could select a clear plurality
were dissatisfied with leadership of their supervisors .

It must

be understood that the question makes no demand on the respondent
to reach a decision--that is to say, which were you most dis
satisfied with, not which caused you to leave the service ?
Question 9 .

Were your commanders receptive to your

recommendations and suggestions?
a.

b,
c.
d.

All of my commanders were receptive
to my recommendations and suggestions
Most of my commanders were receptive
to my recommendations and suggestions
Few of my commanders were receptive
to my recommendations and suggestions
None of my commanders were receptive
to my recommendations and suggestions

JS respondents

156
46
4

"

"
"

The response in this question indicates that there was
relatively effective communication between J unior and Senior

Officers as to the Officers' receptiveness to Junior Officers '
recommendations and suggestions.
Question 10.

Did you consider your superior officers well

qualified for their job?
a. All of them
b. Most of them
c . Few of them
d. None of them

22
153
66
3

responses
responses
responses
responses

The majority of respondents felt that most of their Senior
Officers were well qualified for their jobs.

However , a sizable

number of respondents indicated that their Senior Officers were
less than qualified for their jobs.
Question 11. Do you feel that your commanders were
sincerely interested in your remaining in the Army and choosing the
Army as a career?
a.
b.
c.
d.

All of them
Host of them
Few of them
None of them

40
88
106
10

responses
responses
responses
responses

16 . 'J}'o
31.6�;
4J. 4%
4. 1%

Of the Junior Officers responding, 4J . 4% held that few of

their Commanders (Senior Officers) were sincerely interested in

the Junior Officers' remaining in and choosing the Army as a career .

These responses certainly do not indicate any strong positive
Senior Officer influence on an affirmative decision.
Question 12.

Did any of your superior officers counsel

you concerning an Army Career?
a.
b.

yes
no

176 responses
68 resµ> nses
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This quest ion is related directly to question 11.

Basic

U. S. Army policy recommends that all Senior Officers counsel Junior
Officers about remaining in the service and about making the Army
a career.

This is shown by the

yes to question 12.

72% of the respondents answering

The relationship of question 11 an d question

12 shows that even though 176 of the responden ts stated that they
were counseled by their superiors, 106 respondent s in questi on 11
stated that few were interested in their remaining in or choosing the
Army as a career.

Apparently the intended message was not

communicated positively to the Junior Officer.
Quest ion lJ.

Do you feel that your personal desires

concerning assignments, branch and other considerations were taken
into account by the Army?
a.
b.
c.

Yes
No, but I received a satisfactory explanat ion as to why
they were not.
No, and I did not receive a
satisfactory explanation as to
why they were not.

153 responses

63 . 0%

31 responses

11 . 5%

60 res ponses

24. 6%

An explanation of Army policy must be given here before one
can fully understand the question and its answers .

Department of

the Army made and still makes it well known that personal desires
concerning assignments, branch and other considerations will be

taken into full account once the need of the Army has been filled. 10

This can be best illustrated by showing the relationship between
an individual and DA (Department of the Army).
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An individual wishes to be assign ed to Germany; the Army
has X number of spaces available at the time in Germany and X + Y
individuals requesting Germany.

With more personnel requesting

Germany than there are spaces, some desires are not met; however,
they were taken into account.

The majority of respondents ( 153) felt their desires were

taken into account.

The next Jl respondents felt their desires

were not taken into account ( i. e. , the example stated above) , and
finally , �. 60 respondents felt their desires were not taken
into account nor did they receive satisfactory answers as to why
they were not considered.
A breakdown in communication affected at least 60
respondents .

Communication breakdowns do occur in both directions,

up and down.

This failure may have been in either direction.

Question 14.

To what extent were your education, training

and experience (both civilian and military) utilized in your duty
assignments?
a.
b.
c.

W ell utilized
Utilized
Not utilized

66 responses
l0 J responses
75 responses

27fo
42%
31%

The majority of respondents felt that their education and

training were being utilized, but not to the fullest extent possible,
as seen in c.

Not having one ' s education and training fully

utilized can hav8 detrimental effects on the individual, causing
discontent and . dissatisfaction on the job and a breakdown in the
upward and downward flow of communication.
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Question 16 .

Did you receive an orientation or counseling

period on how to apply for a Regular Army Commission, indefinite
category or short term extension, prior to your release from

Active D uty?

a. Yes, and it did influence me to
remain on active duty beyond
my obligation •
b. Yes, but it did not influence
my plans to leave active duty.
c . No, and it might have influenced
me to remain longer on active
duty.
d . No, but it would not have
influenced my plans to leave
active duty.
e. I do not remember .

66 responses

27%

58 responses

24%

22 responses

g/o

93 responses
responses

3�

2%

To understand the communication relationship between those
officers who received an orientation or counseling period and those
who did not receive an orientation or counseling period, and their
decisions to remain on active duty or get out, a comparison between
.§:

and

E , £ and _q_,

.§:

and £, and

E and .9. must be undertaken. a

represents 27% of the total 2 44, E represents 2��, £ represents gfo,

i represents

35% and � represents 2% , which is of little value to the

overall data revealed by the question.

In comparing � and E• both answers show that there was a

two-way communication between J unior Officers and those higher up.
Comparing £ and .9., shows there was no communication in both
directions, upward and downward. However, had there been communi
cation in £ , more indiv iduals may have been influenced to stay.
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In compar ing � and E, one sees that in one case communi
cation was effective in keeping Junior Officers , and in the other
case, had there been communication between higher and lower ran ks,
more individuals might have stayed on active duty .
Answers to

E

and £, indicate that regardless of communication

or the lack of it , there was no intent on the part of the
individuals to remain on active duty.
Question 1 8.

Did the Ordnance Corp satisfactorily manage

your career?
a.
b.
c.

Yes
No
No opinion

105 responses
7 0 res pon ses
69 res:pon ses

Responses show that a plurality of individuals ( not the
total asked) who an swered the question w ere satisfied with the
two-way communication between themselves and those who managed
their careers.
Question 26 .
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Leadership of superiors .

Strong influence to stay
Moderate influence to stay
No influence
Moderate influence to leave
Strong influence to leave

9 respon ses
3 9 respon ses
49 responses
76 respon ses
71 respon ses

3 . 7%
15 . 9%

2 0 . 1%

3 1 . 2%
29 . 1%

The number of individuals dissati sfied with their Senior

Officers ' ability to lead their subordinates is clearly shown by

the responses to £ and � vs . the responses to _§: and b in the abo ve
question .
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Question 28 .
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Efficiency Reports .

Strong influence to stay
Moderate influence to stay
No influence
Moderate influence to leave
Strong influence to leave

22 responses
32 responses
102 responses
responses
44 responses

13. 2°/4
4 1 . 8fo
l&/o
18%

Effic tency reports are written by Superior or Senior
Officers. Dur ing the time frame of this study there was no
re:i_ uirement of the Senior Officers to show the completed report to
the individual he rated .

Therefore, it is felt that this may have

been the cause of the high frequency of " no influence, " as those
officers did not know what their Senior Officers wrote about them .
Question 58 .

Provide Junior Officers with more opportunity

for command experience.
I would definitely make
the Army a career.
b. I would possibly make the
Army a career.
c. This would have no influence
on my career decision.
d. I would possibly leave active
duty .
e. I would definitely leave
active duty.
a.

13 responses

5 . 4%

71 responses

2 9 . J.%

147 responses

60 . 2%

9 responses

J . 7%

}

l . cfo

responses

This communication relationship question affected the

individual 's decision· to remain on active duty vs . leaving active
duty.

Although the majority of individuals who responded to the

question stated it had no influence on their career decision, the
84 who responded positively that had there been more communication
with their Senior Officers, more would have remained on active
duty.
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Question 80.

I hoped to receive responsibility and

challenges; to lead others.
a.
b.
c.

Strong influence
Moderate influence
No influence

166 responses
68 responses
10 responses

This question deals with "Why the Ind ividual Chose a
Commission in the Army. "

Sixty-eight percent indicated that, hoping

to receive responsibility and challenge; to lead others , was an
extremely strong influence to choose a Commission in the Army.
The majority of individuals felt that they could communicate with
those higher and lower and be able to be leaders of others.
The next six questions dealt with the individual respondents'
describing their Senior Officers.
Question 88 .
a.
b.
c.

Give constructive criti cism.

This is a highly accurate description
of my Senior Officer.
This is a somewhat accurate d escription
of my Sen ior Officer .
This is a highly inaccurate description
of my Senior Officer.

JS responses

144 responses
56 responses

The majority of individuals felt that their Senior Officers
did give them constructive criticism when it was given.

What is

n ot known is how many times each individual received constructive
criticism from his superiors.
Quest ion 89.
a.
b.

c.

Critique me in front of others .

This is a highly accurate description
of flY Senior Officer .
This is a somewhat accurate description
of my Senior Officer .
This is a highly inaccurate description
of my Senior Officer.

24 responses

66 responses

154 responses
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This question does show a relatively high degree of positive
communication between Junior and Senior Officers.

However, A and

B show that 37fo of the Junior Officers may have been critiqued
by their Senior Officers in front of others , which is a fairly
high degree of negative communication.
Quest1on 90 .

a.
b.
c.

Commend me for good work.

This is a highly accurate description
of my Senior Officer.
This is a somewhat accurate description
of my Senior Officer.
This is a highly inaccurate description
of my Senior Officer.

46 responses

139 responses

59 responses

This question does show a high percentage of individuals
felt that they received little commendatory communication
concerning their effective efforts.
Question 92 .
a.

b.

c.

Give me counsel and guidance.

This is a highly accurate description
of my Senior Officer.
This is a somewhat accurate description
of my Senior Officer.
This is a highly inaccurate description
of - my Senior Officer.

37 responses

137 responses
70

responses

In dealing with Junior Officers, many Senior Off icers were

perceived as failing in their efforts to give guidance and counsel
to the Junior Officer.
Question 93 .

Consider '' ine..· perience0 in their evaluation

of Junior Officers.
a.

b.

Thj s is a highly accurate description
of my Senior Officer .
This is a somewhat accurate description
of my Senior Officer. ·

49 responses
142 responses

7J
c.

This is a highly inaccurate description
of my Senior Officer.

56 responses

Question 94. Are objective in their Efficiency R atings
a.

b.
c.

This is a highly accurate description
of my Senior Officer.
This is a somewhat accurate description
of my Senior Officer.
This is a highly inaccurate description
of my Senior Officer.

49 responses
124 responses

71 responses

The prime method of evaluating an officer ' s worth in the
Army is with Efficiency Reports done by the rated officers Senior.
I nexperience and objectivity are both considered indicators within

the efficiency evaluation system.

Therefore, Questions 93 and 94

must be analyzed together because of their relationship to each
other within the efficiency evaluation system.

Inexperience on the

part of Junior Officers is something Senior Officers were pe r ceived
as failing to understand, many Junior Officers may have never been
placed in positions of responsibility before and they had to
respond correctly or face the inevitable bad efficiency rating.
Objectivity on the part of Senior Officers is something

Senior Officers were perceived as lacking when considering an

efficiency evaluation of the Junior Officer ' s job performance.
Question 97.

What effect did your relationship with

Senior Officers have on your Army career decision?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

--

Strong influence to leave
Moderate influence to leave
No influence
Moderate influence to stay
Strong influence to stay

68
68
51
32

responses
responses
responses
responses
25 responses

27.9%
2 7 . gfo 55 . 8fo
20.9%
lJ. 1%
10.2% 2J . J%
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W ith 55.Bfo of the respondents answering that their
relationship with their Senior Officers had a moderate to strong
influence on their leaving active duty, a communication gap between
Seniors and Juniors appears to have been shown.
The next four questions deal with the individual and how
he or she perceived him/herself .
Question 98.
a.
b.
c.

Leadership

Exhibit to high degree
Exhibit to moderate degree
Do not exhibit

99 responses
1J9 responses
6 responses

40 . 6%
56.gfv
2 . 5%

Question 108. Ability to communicate.
a.
b.
c.

Exhibit to high degree
Exhibit to moderate degree
Do not exhibit

120 responses
115 responses
9 responses

49.2%
47.1%

J . 7%

Question 109. Ability to make decisions.
a. Exhibit to high degree
b. Exhibit to moderate degree
c. Do not exhibit

161 responses
76 responses
7 responses

a. Exhibit to high degree
b. Exhibit to moderate degree
c. Do not exhibit

1J2 responses
107 responses
5 responses

Question 110.

A bility to accept and follow orders .
54. 1%
4J.9;�
2.{Yfe

In analyzing all four of the above questions the majority

of the respondents felt that they displayed a moderate to strong
ability to communicate with each other, with the men they lead

and with their superiors, such self-evaluation must be considered
hi ghly inconclusive.
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Question llJ .

How many formal o r informal career

counseling interviews did you have with your Senior Officer s ?
a.
b.
c.
d.

67
4J
26
61

1
2
J
4 or more

responses
responses
responses
responses

27 . 4%

1 7 . 5%
10 . 5%
19 . J%

A plurality o f Junior Officers respo nding received only
o ne formal or informal career -coun seling interview during their
stay on active duty.
Ques tio n 114.

What was the att i tude o f yo ur career

counselor towards you and your career?
a.
b.
c.
d.

Very interested
Mo derately interested
No t interested
Was no t counseled

6 7 responses
86 responses
41 respo nses
5 0 responses

2 7 . 5fo
3 5 . 2%
16 . 8%

20 . 5%

The majority of individuals who were coun seled were

moderately happy with the interest their career counselors too k
I t must be understood that an individual ' s career

in them .

counselor for the mo st part was no t the individual ' s Senior Officer,
but an individual who dealt with career coun seling as his primary
job .
Questio n 1 15 .

What effect did these career-counseling

sessions have o n your A rmy Career decision?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Stro ng influence to stay
Mo derate influence to stay
No influence
Moderate influence to leave
Strong influence to leave

11 respo nses
53 respo nses

1 4J r esponses
16 respo nses
21 respo nses

4 . 5%

21 . 7%
5 8 . 6%
6 . 6%
8 . 6%

Here the majority of individual respondents stated that
the career counseling sessions had no influence on their
decisions , though more than one-fourth did perceive a positive
effect from the commun ication.
Analysis o f the study tends to indicate that those
Ordnance Junior Officers uho chose to separate from active duty
were very much concerned with " leadership o f superiors" as an
aspect o f mili tary life with which they were most dissatisfied .
This coupled with other relationship perceptions by the Junior
Officer may have been instrumental in creating an atmosphere of
dissatisfaction which over a period o f time led to a career decision
to separate .
SUMMAR Y
The communication questions included in each study were
presented in parts 1 , 2 , and

J.

Each study was co nducted by a

different o rgan ization and at different times.

The Fran klin Study was completed in September, 196 8, which

makes it the oldest study used in the research .

Many o f the

Army ' s problems with Jun ior O fficers began after 1 9 6 8 and con tinued
on thro ugh 1 9 72.

As indicated by the mean intensity index, the poor

commun ication was not likely to have been a strong decisive influence
on the J unior Officer and his Army career decis ion to separate when

compared with the composite mean intensity index o f the non 
communication questions.
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The West Point S tudy was completed in July 1970 and dealt

with proble�s encoun tered by West Point Graduates of the Class
of 1966 during the Army's personnel turmoil from 1968.

The mean

intensity index differences between the total non-communication
questions and the communication ques tions shows that the
communication factors might have had more decisive effect on the
Junior Officer to separate.
The Ordnance Study was completed in May 1971 and dealt
with Junior Officer retention in the Ordnance Corp.

The study

consisted of 116 questions dealing with aspects of the Junior
Officer's attitudes toward the mili tary and his/her Senior
Officers .
A clear cut analysis of the Ordnance Study was not
accomplished due to the format of the study.

The study i tself

was not set up using numerical answer discriminations or an
attitudinal scale for the respondents to select.
to questions �ere analyzed as separate units .

However, responses

Analysis of the

responses indicate seven general factors which may have indluenced
the 244 respondents to leave military service .

These are ranked,

in order of purported influence , in Table V, page 7 8 .
Any attempt to draw statistical conclusions from extensive
comparison of all three studies combined would be impractical due
to the variety of questions and formats u tili zed in all studies .

However, there is little reason to conclude that the studies
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TABLE V
INFLUENCING FACTOR S TO LEAVE THE ARNY*
Tour in Vi etnam

Total 172/244

Family Separation

Total 166/244

Civilian O pportunities

Total 158/244

Sr . Off . Leadership

Total 150/244

Frequent Mo ve s

Total 131/2 44

Duty Ass ignment
Personal N eeds

Total 111/244

0%

Total 100/244 r

%

l

1
5 0%

I

I

I

I

70 . 4%
68.0%
64.7%
61 . 4%
53.6%

45 . 4%
40 . 9fo

100%

of R e sponding Offic ers ( 244)

*Ordnan ce Corps Officers Lo ses
This table was derived from the complete Ordnan ce Corps
Study .

Ea ch influencing factor was made up fro m a question group

in the study dealing with the specific influenc e .

The complete

list of factor s consisted of nineteen major significant ar eas of

influence .

The seven shown in the chart are the major influencing

factors causing the J unior Officer to separate from active duty .

--
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indicate communication problems between J unior and Senior Officers
were of any overriding influence in the J unior Officers' decisions
to separate.
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CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary

The purpose of this study has been to determine the

communica tion relatio nship between Senior Army Officers and Junior
Officers who separated from the service voluntarily from 1966
through 1970 as revealed in selected U.S . Army Studies.

A survey of appro priate publicatio ns was conducted to find

any previous studies similar to this research subject.

Those

studies which appeared similar were analyzed further and fo und
to be different from this current study.

Thus, the uniqueness of

this s tudy was established .
Three U. S. Army studies were utilized as the basis of data
from which an analysis of the communicatio n relationship between
Junior and Senior U. S . A rmy Officers could be made.

The studies

were analyzed in an attempt to determine the degree, nature, and

directio n of communication between J unio r an d Senior Officers as

a factor in the Junior Officers ' decisio n to separate fro m active
military service between 1 966 and 1970.
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A Summary of Events
The V i etnam War
I n July 1964 , the United States became involved , w ith the
Gulf of Tonkin resolution, with the South Vietnamese in their war
with North Vietnam .

As the United States sank deeper and deeper

i nto the war , protest act ivity escalated at home .
home bred discontent within the military.

Discontent at

I n 1970 , retention of

Junior Officers reached its lowest level in more than 10 years ,
causing military leaders great concern.

I t was thi s concern that

led to a number of studies on retention .

However , the studies on

retention did not fully address the problem of poor commun i cation
and a communication breakdown as factors in Jun ior Officer . .

retention .
The retention problem
I t was during the final years of the V ietnam W ar that the
U . S . Army began to realize that i t had a problem with insuffici ent
retention of Junior Offi cers .

Because of this retention problem

the U . S . Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personn el conducted

several retention studies, using Army and outside agencie s to

co nduct the studies to learn why J unior Officers on active military

serv i ce , who at one time favored an Army career , voluntar i ly
separated from active duty.

The recommendations an d findings of

these studies were to be used to implement new programs to improve

J unior Officer r etention.

BJ
Summary of the Studies
The Franklin Study
The Franklin Study was directed toward identifying the
relationships among various factors that influenced J unior Officers'
Army career decisions .

Special emphasis of the study was given

to duty assignments, career management, leadership of superiors,
duties and career counseling.

The group selected for study was

company grade officers with more than six months but less than
five years active federal commissioned service.
The questionnaire was distributed to more than 4500

individuals by the Franklin Institute Research Laboratories , 2977
individuals responded to the 424 questions. All questions and
answers were based on attitudinal scale.

The Franklin Study results only highlighted communication

questions and responses.

This researcher took communication

questions from the Franklin Study and analyzed those questions in

an attempt to determine the effect that poor communication played
in the J unior Officer ' s decision to separate.
The West Point Study

The West Point Study was undertaken to determine why the

1966 West Point Class had an abnormally high number of resignations
from active duty and the factors which influenced the individual's
career decision, with emphasis being placed on leadership of

superiors, duty assignments, career management, efficiency reports,
family separations and career counseling.
The questionnaire, consisting of 70 objective questions
based on attitudinal scale, was administered to the 100 resignees
by mail with eighty-one resignees responding.

This research

extrac ted the communication questions and did an analysis intended
to determine the role poor communication played in the graduates'
decision to leave active duty.
The Ordnance Study
The Ordnance Study was d irected toward identifying the
various factors that influenced Ordnance Corps, Junior Officers'
decisions to separate.

During the study, special emphasis was

given to factors of possible influence, such as duty assignemtns,
leadership of superiors, family separation, career management,
and career counseling.
The survey was directed to the 446 Ordnance Corps Junior

Officers wm separated from active duty between 1966 and 1970, by
mail with 244 individuals responding to the questionnaire. The

questionnaire consisted of 116 questions, either multiple choice
or attitude scale.

Because of the two different types of questions

utilized, an exact analysis of the extracted communication-type
questions was not possible .

However, each question was evaluated

based on a percentage of respondents who selected a specific answer

discriminator.

Conclusions
Based on the findings of this study , the following
conclusions have been drawn:
1.

During the final years of the Vietnamese War the

United States Army experienced a serious problem in retention of
Junior Officers.
2.

Three specific studies were undertaken by the United

States Army which were intended to identify the causes of the high
level of separations of Junior Officers.

J.

While these studies did not categorize questions as

dealing with communication, a number of communication-related
questions were identified in each study.
4.

W hile communication problems between Junior and Senior

Officers during the period covered by this study may have been
influential in the Junior Officers' decisions to separate, the
findings in this present inquiry do not support a conclusion that
communication problems were more influential than the composite
of other factors.
Recommendations for Further Study
With what has been learned from this study about communi

cation and Junior Officer retention, it is recommended that another
study be undertaken to determine the communication relationships
between Junior and Senior Officers who are currently serving in

the active Army, and how the communication relationship has
affected Junior Officer retention.
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I t is further recommended that such a study be desiV') ed
to allo w for a measure of statisti cal significance in the
findings .

Perhaps such a study could utiliz e some or all of the

communication questions identified in this pres ent inquiry .

The

h i storic milieu provided in this study may also provi de a
foundation for further inquiry i�to the ro le of communicat ion
between Junior and Senior Officers in the Junior Officer s ' decisions
to separate.
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